This essay is a study on national self-determination and justice from the differing perspectives of John Rawls and Rabindranath Tagore. Both thinkers have addressed the problem of conflict caused by national loyalties. Influenced by Immanuel Kant’s philosophy of cosmopolitanism, John Rawls articulates the “Law of People” that suggests that mutual consent consists in economic interdependence among nations and tolerance for cultural diversity under monitored conditions of the international relations. Such an arrangement is not inclusive as it excludes the subaltern perspectives (...) and reinforces the hierarchies between East and West. Tagore offers post-colonial versions of nationalism and cosmopolitanism that call for a creative and spiritual unity of nations through cultural exchange where each is equal in dialogue. The essay makes a case for Tagore’s cosmopolitanism being more inclusive than Rawls, yet, limited in its accommodation of the “other” as Tagore’s creative unity domesticates this “other” on the basis of spiritual familiarity. The essay also critiques Martha Nussbaum’s cosmopolitanism that suggests reconciliation of both. It makes a case for a paradoxical understanding of hospitality, friendship and otherness theorized by Jacques Derrida as the basis of self-determination and global justice. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Clinical CommentaryRathi Mahendran, Associate ProfessorThe doctor-patient relationship has an important role in medical practice and in medical ethics.1 In modern times, the word “boundary” is used to frame the relationship. In the context of therapy, Gutheil and Simon have described it as “the edge of appropriate or professional behaviour, transgression of which involves the therapist stepping out of the clinical role”.2 Boundaries establish for medical professionals the distinctions between (...) professional and personal identity.3 In a therapeutic setting, boundaries distinguish acceptable and appropriate interactions and the parameters of professional conduct.4 Implicit in the concept of boundaries are the basic ethical principles of beneficence (doing good, acting in another person’s best interests), non-maleficence (doing no harm) and justice with respect for the individual’s needs and autonomy.The doctor-patient relationship is particularly important in psychological therapies where trust, integrity, confidentiality, a safe environment and empathy are fundamental to the therapeutic process. A person with BPD manifests emotional dysregulation with instability in interpersonal relationships, self-image, affect and impulsivity.5 This, together with identity disturbances, makes them a particularly vulnerable group with heightened reliance on their therapist.6Psychotherapy has been described as an interaction which serves to alleviate distress, change behaviour and alter the patient’s perspective of issues. This description however does not reflect the magnitude and significant power differentials in the relationship. Trust and a close bond are needed to allow issues to be addressed.7 In the process, patients’ fantasies and unmet emotional needs [End Page 191] might lead them to knowingly or unknowingly view their therapist differently and to seek a relationship. Similarly, multiple factors in the therapist (situational factors, intrapsychic and interpersonal factors) can undermine the therapeutic process.8Boundary TransgressionsThere is really no universal definition for a “therapeutic boundary” possibly because, as Simon explains, it is “a function of the nature of the patient, the treatment and the status of the therapeutic alliance”.9 Minor violations are referred to as boundary crossings which may arise because the therapist exhibits poor judgement.10 Such actions are non-exploitative and pose little risk to patients.11 Duckworth et al. describe how boundary crossings begin as “exaggerations of desirable attitudes”. Special arrangements and sessions for the patient and extending therapy sessions may be construed as desirable and arguably as effective for the therapeutic alliance.12 Yet, if not examined objectively, they become “subtle breaks in the therapeutic frame”.13Psychotherapists trained in analytic therapy hold very rigid views of doctor-patient interactions in psychological therapy. Some would argue that providing a personal telephone number for a patient in crisis situations is a permissible boundary crossing.14 Similarly, self-disclosure for modelling and on-site behaviour therapy interventions may be viewed as necessary for the therapeutic encounter.15The most commonly recognised boundary crossing, however, is self-disclosure.16 It occurs when the therapist relates a personal experience or information to the patient which is how the incident began in this case.17 It gradually progressed to an informal, friendly style of interaction, accepting a hug, thanking her for being a good friend, all of which are dissonant with the psychotherapeutic process.18In the first place, should the therapist have even offered to drive her home, notwithstanding the heavy downpour? While that offer could be viewed as helpful, the disclosure of marital problems was inappropriate and created confusion. We can only speculate upon the therapist’s behaviour. Was he trying to establish for his patient that they were both experiencing problems to gain her trust? Was he exhibiting some form of identification or did he have some unmet need for affirmation and for care and nurturance? It is difficult to rationalise the apparently thoughtless and impulsive behaviour.19The therapist was, at that point, vulnerable with marital problems and facing separation.20 Procci has highlighted that therapists who breach boundaries, “usually have serious personal problems and may have a psychiatric diagnoses”.21 Even though the relationship was non-sexual, it [End Page 192] moved beyond a boundary crossing and should be viewed as a boundary violation. While the most serious form of boundary violation is the sexual encounter... (shrink)

This book presents a selection of essays by the Indian philosopher J.L. Mehta on the topics of hermeneutics and phenomenology containing many original ...

Shedding light on a fundamental tension in liberal theory, Liberalism and Empire reaches beyond post-colonial studies to revise our conception of the grand liberal tradition and the conception of experience with which it is associated.

Consider two deeply appealing thoughts: first, that we experience external particulars, and second, that what it’s like to have an experience – the phenomenal character of an experience – is somehow independent of external particulars. The first thought is readily captured by phenomenal particularism, the view that external particulars are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of experience. The second thought is readily captured by phenomenal generalism, the view that external particulars are never part of phenomenal character. -/- Here I (...) show that a novel version of phenomenal generalism can capture both thoughts in a satisfying fashion. Along the way, I reveal severe problems facing phenomenal particularism and also shed light on the mental kinds under which experiences fall. (shrink)

Here I advance a unified account of the structure of the epistemic normativity of assertion, action, and belief. According to my Teleological Account, all of these are epistemically successful just in case they fulfill the primary aim of knowledgeability, an aim which in turn generates a host of secondary epistemic norms. The central features of the Teleological Account are these: it is compact in its reliance on a single central explanatory posit, knowledge-centered in its insistence that knowledge sets the fundamental (...) epistemic norm, and yet fiercely pluralistic in its acknowledgment of the legitimacy and value of a rich range of epistemic norms distinct from knowledge. Largely in virtue of this pluralist character, I argue, the Teleological Account is far superior to extant knowledge-centered accounts. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 104, Issue 1, Page 209-231, January 2022.

According to phenomenal particularism, external particulars are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of experience. Mehta criticizes this view, and French and Gomes :451–460, 2016) have attempted to show that phenomenal particularists have the resources to respond to Mehta’s criticisms. We argue that French and Gomes have failed to appreciate the force of Mehta’s original arguments. When properly interpreted, Mehta’s arguments provide a strong case in favor of phenomenal generalism, the view that external particulars are never (...) part of phenomenal character. (shrink)

It can seem incoherent to fully characterize fundamentality in terms of grounding, given that the fundamental is precisely that which cannot be fully characterized independently. I argue that there is no such incoherence.

What I require is a convening of my culture's criteria, in order to confront them with my words and life as I pursue them and as I may pursue them; and at the same time to confront my words and life as I pursue them with the life my culture's words may imagine for me: to confront the culture with itself, along the lines it meets in me. Stanley Cavell.

What grounds facts of the form? One promising answer is: facts of the form. A different promising answer is: x itself. Isaac Wilhelm has recently argued that the second answer is superior to the first. In this paper, I rebut his argument.

I assume that there exists a general phenomenon, the phenomenon of the explanatory gap, surrounding consciousness, normativity, intentionality, and more. Explanatory gaps are often thought to foreclose reductive possibilities wherever they appear. In response, reductivists who grant the existence of these gaps have offered countless local solutions. But typically such reductivist responses have had a serious shortcoming: because they appeal to essentially domain-specific features, they cannot be fully generalized, and in this sense these responses have been not just local but (...) parochial. Here I do better. Taking for granted that the explanatory gap is a genuine phenomenon, I offer a fully general diagnosis that unifies these previously fragmented reductivist responses. (shrink)

In this paper, I advance a new hypothesis about what the ordinary concept of perceptual experience might be. To a first approximation, my hypothesis is that it is the concept of something that seems to present mind-independent objects. Along the way, I reveal two important errors in Michael Martin’s argument for the very different view that the ordinary concept of perceptual experience is the concept of something that is impersonally introspectively indiscriminable from a veridical perception. This conceptual work is significant (...) because it provides three pieces of good news for the common kind theorist. (shrink)

Using Canada as a case study, this article argues that regulating biotechnology and nanotechnology is made unnecessarily complex and inherently unstable because of a failure to consult the public early and of-ten enough. Furthermore, it is argued that future regulators (and promoters) of nanotechnology may learn valuable lessons from the mistakes made in regulating biotechnology.

In his 2009 article “Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology,” Uriah Kriegel argues for self-representationalism about phenomenal consciousness primarily on phenomenological grounds. Kriegel’s argument can naturally be cast more broadly as an argument for higher-order representationalism. I examine this broadened version of Kriegel’s argument in detail and show that it is unsuccessful for two reasons. First, Kriegel’s argument (in its strongest form) relies on an inference to the best explanation from the claim that all experiences of normal adult human beings are accompanied by (...) peripheral awareness of those very experiences to the claim that all experiences are accompanied by peripheral awareness of those very experiences. This inference is inadequately defended, for the explanandum may also be given a straightforward evolutionary explanation. Second, contra Kriegel, I argue that phenomenological investigation does not support the thesis that we are always peripherally aware of our experiences. Instead, it delivers no verdict on this thesis. Kriegel’s phenomenological mistake may be explained via a highly diluted version of the famous transparency thesis about experience. (shrink)

Pure insight, however is in the first instance without any content; it is the sheer disappearance of content; but by its negative attitude towards what it excludes it will make itself real and give itself a content.—Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind.

Sociologists of science and others have long been interested in how advances in science come about, and their potential social and economic impacts. Developments in nanoscience and nanotechnology will provide social scientists with a unique opportunity to explore how scientific activities form de novo. Additionally, scientists will have the opportunity to examine the factors that drive science and technology in certain directions by considering how different models of innovation may explain how the topography of the knowledge-based economy is being shaped (...) by radically new approaches to science. (shrink)

I highlight a neglected but striking phenomenological fact about our experiences: they have a pervasively spatial character. Specifically, all (or almost all) phenomenal qualities – roughly, the introspectible, philosophically puzzling properties that constitute ‘what it’s like’ to have an experience – introspectively seem instantiated in some kind of space. So, assuming a very weak charity principle about introspection, some phenomenal qualities are instantiated in space. But there is only one kind of space – the ordinary space occupied by familiar objects. (...) And the only objects appropriately located in ordinary space are outside the subject’s mind. This entails experiential externalism, the view that at least one phenomenal quality is instantiated outside the subject’s mind. Experiential externalism is incompatible with many leading theories of experience, including certain mental paint theories; some forms of representationalism; paradigmatic versions of sense-datum theory; and views on which no phenomenal qualities are instantiated. My argument is structurally similar to familiar arguments based on the ‘transparency of experience.’ However, I suggest, phenomenological intuitions about spatiality are considerably more stable than phenomenological intuitions about transparency. For many philosophers, transparency intuitions fade markedly with respect to non-standard experiences, including experiences associated with blurry or double vision. But spatiality intuitions remain robust even for these experiences. Thus, spatiality intuitions should be more dialectically effective than transparency intuitions for supporting experiential externalism. (shrink)

Naïve realism is a theory of perception with great explanatory ambitions. It has been influentially argued that, in order to realize these explanatory ambitions, the naïve realist should say that any perception belongs to just one fundamental kind. I think, however, that adopting this commitment does not particularly help the naïve realist to realize her explanatory ambitions, and so is not warranted. This result is significant because once this commitment about fundamental kinds is relinquished, we see that it is possible (...) to develop some new and surprising forms of naïve realism—most notably, what I call pluralist naïve realism. (shrink)

This paper is about Gandhi's critique of politics, of which his ambivalence towards democracy was a part. I argue that for Gandhi the ground of moral action is fearlessness, while that of political reason is security and self-defense. Gandhi sees the context of moral action in the mundane fabric of everyday life, in places such as the family and the village. For that reason he does not believe that moral action requires being supplemented by the particular kind of unity which (...) politics and the state call for and necessitate. (shrink)

Philosophical theory about the nature of human beings has far reaching consequences on our understanding of various issues faced by them. Once taken as self-evident, it becomes the foundation on which knowledge gets built. The cause of concern is that this theoretical framework rarely gets questioned despite its inherent limitations and self-defeating consequences, leading to crisis in the concerned field. The field, which is facing crisis today, is that of medicine, and the paradigmatic stance that is responsible for the crisis (...) is Cartesian dualism-a view that mind and body are essentially separate entities. This paper discusses Cartesian dualism in the context of the practice of medicine. Focusing more closely on how disease, health and treatment are defined through this position, the paper builds up its critique by throwing light on its accomplishments, limitations and self-defeating consequences. The paper also seeks to understand why this dualism is still alive despite its disavowal from philosophers, health practitioners and lay people. (shrink)

According to the Epistemic Theory of Mind, knowledge is part of the best overall framework for explaining behavior at the psychological level. This theory, which has become increasingly popular in recent decades, has almost always been conjoined with an invariantist theory of “knows.” In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake: the Epistemic Theory of Mind is far more explanatorily powerful when conjoined with contextualism. I conclude that if the Epistemic Theory of Mind is true, then there is (...) a powerful new reason to accept contextualism. (shrink)

The enduring appeal of liberalism lies in its commitment to the idea that human beings have a "natural" potential to live as free and equal individuals. The realization of this potential, however, is not a matter of nature, but requires that people be molded by a complex constellation of political and educational institutions. In this eloquent and provocative book, Uday Singh Mehta investigates in the major writings of John Locke the implications of this tension between individuals and the institutions (...) that mold them. The process of molding, he demonstrates, involves an external conformity and an internal self-restraint that severely limit the scope of individuality. Mehta explores the centrality of the human imagination in Locke's thought, focusing on his obsession with the potential dangers of the cognitive realm. Underlying Locke's fears regarding the excesses of the imagination is a political anxiety concerning how to limit their potential effects. In light of Locke's views on education, Mehta concludes that the promise of liberation at the heart of liberalism is vitiated by its constraints on cognitive and political freedom. (shrink)

This guide focuses on the content and form of excellent philosophical writing, with further comments on reading, thinking, writing processes, publication strategies, and self-cultivation.

I construct a tempting anti-physicalist argument, which sharpens an explanatory gap argument suggested by David Chalmers and Frank Jackson. The argument relies crucially on the premise that there is a deep epistemic asymmetry (which may be identified with the explanatory gap) between phenomenal truths and ordinary macroscopic truths. Many physicalists reject the argument by rejecting this premise. I argue that even if this premise is true, the anti-physicalist conclusion should be rejected, and I provide a detailed, physicalist-friendly explanation of the (...) relevant premise. Along the way, I sketch an account of a priori conceptual knowledge that is compatible with naturalistic accounts of intentionality. I conclude by noting that the resulting view is a version of the popular phenomenal concept strategy that avoids a potentially worrying dilemma facing earlier incarnations of this strategy. (shrink)

Representationalism is, roughly, the view that experiencing is to be analyzed wholly in terms of representing. But what sorts of properties are represented in experience? According to a prominent form of representationalism, objective representationalism, experiences represent only objective (i.e. suitably mind-independent) properties. I explore subjective representationalism, the view that experiences represent at least some subjective (i.e. suitably mind-dependent) properties. Subjective representationalists, but not objective representationalists, can accommodate cases of illusion-free phenomenal inversion. Moreover, subjective representationalism captures the so-called transparency of experience, (...) as it is standardly articulated, just as well as objective representationalism. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic brought unprecedented strain on hospitals and, in particular, critical care settings. Early in the pandemic, multiple plans were developed to ration ventilators in anticipatio...

_ Source: _Volume 11, Issue 2, pp 117 - 148 The paper examines the problem of self-knowledge from the perspectives of Plotinus and the Indian Advaita school. Analyzing the subject-object relation, I show that according to both Plotinus and Advaita thinkers, full self-knowledge demands complete absence of otherness. Plotinus argues that if self-consciousness is divided into subject-object relation then one will know oneself as contemplated but not as contemplating and no real self-knowledge obtains in this case. Śaṅkara, who constitutes an (...) important representative of Advaita thought, points out that the self cannot know itself as an object because what is called an object to be known becomes established when it is separated from the self, the subject. I argue that at the level of the One, similar to the state of _ātman_ consciousness in Advaita framework, the soul experiences itself in expansive non-dual consciousness. Lastly, I examine the role of non-duality as the foundation of knowledge. (shrink)

In the past decades, the world has witnessed significant growth in environmental issues such as the generation of waste, climatic changes, and depletion of natural resources. Due to this, there has been a substantial upsurge in consumers who prefer green products. Hence, exploring the stable set of characteristics of green consumers becomes extremely important for organizations to develop customer‐oriented targeting and segmenting strategies. The present study attempts to explore key factors influencing green purchase behavior and the behavioral profile of green (...) consumers in the Indian context. The study surveyed 400 respondents from Punjab. Multivariate analysis was performed to analyze the data. The results of the analysis revealed three distinctive consumer clusters based on green purchase behavior. “Pro‐environmentals” represent the segment of green consumers. Consumers of this cluster were found to be highly environmentally conscious. Besides this, the study confirmed noticeable differences in the three clusters in terms of gender, age, number of children, and marital status. Finally, the results indicated the behavioral profile of green and non‐green consumers and explained prominent differences between the three clusters. This knowledge shall enable marketers to design tailor‐made marketing strategies focusing on the specific needs of each consumer cluster. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a new argument for the perceptual rationality thesis: the claim that perceptual experiences themselves can be rational or irrational. In her book The Rationality of Perception, Susanna Siegel has offered several intertwined arguments for this same thesis, and, as you will see, one of Siegel’s arguments is what inspires my own. However, I will suggest that the new argument is significantly better-supported than Siegel’s original argument.

Most contemporary theories of perception, including leading forms of representationalism and naive realism, are monistic: they assume that to consciously perceive is to deploy only one kind of sensory awareness. Here I instead argue for rich pluralism, which says that to consciously perceive is to deploy two very different kinds of sensory awareness in concert: representational awareness of particulars, and non-representational, partly essence-revealing awareness of sensory qualities.

Derek Allan presented a paper at the 2016 OSSA Conference at the University of Windsor; I provided comments on that paper. These are brief notes on my comments.

Terror and its cognates have come to signify the darkest excesses of contemporary and 20th-century political life. These include aggressive claims to purity; murderous manifestations of programmatic and religious self-certainty; paranoid and devastating responses to threats to national security; and more generally, an intensity of instrumental forms of thinking and acting that give to individuals, groups, and states a broad warrant for deploying violence as a means to their purposefulness. Hannah Arendt reflected deeply on the implications of such high-minded and (...) bellicose purposefulness. This chapter focuses on how Arendt also associated terror with something utterly commonplace, whose reach and provenance extended well beyond the 20th century—namely, in the political attempt to address ubiquitous social questions. (shrink)

I defend a subjective representationalist theory of phenomenal experience. On this view, phenomenal experiences are simply certain kinds of representations of subjective (i.e., suitably mind-dependent) physical properties of environmental objects or of one’s body. Chapter 1 focuses on the thoroughly spatial character of experience. Here I argue against views of experience according to which phenomenal properties – roughly, the properties which constitute “what it’s like” to have an experience – are internal to the subject’s mind. If my arguments succeed, then (...) phenomenal properties are outside the subject’s mind. Representationalists typically embrace this claim. Chapter 2 quickly recapitulates some well-known motivations for representationalism and then considers an important choice point for representationalists: are phenomenal properties objective (essentially mind-independent) or subjective (essentially mind-dependent)? I introduce a robust set of inversion intuitions and argue that subjective representationalism, which holds that some phenomenal properties are subjective, can better accommodate such intuitions than objective representationalism. Chapter 3 focuses on the familiar “explanatory gap” problem. I consider a recent version of this argument which concludes that phenomenal consciousness is not reducible to the physical. Since the version of subjective representationalism I hold is part of just such an attempt to reduce phenomenal consciousness to the physical, I spend this chapter developing the resources to respond to Chalmers’ argument. Chapter 4 considers the intuition that internal twins must have precisely the same kinds of phenomenal experiences. This intuition is widespread, powerful, and recalcitrant. But it is very likely that representationalism, especially of the highly externalist sort that I defend in Chapter 1, is incompatible with such intuitions. I argue that this intuition is unreliable and attempt to debunk it. Chapter 5 very tentatively fills in some details of the subjective representationalist account. Representationalists can be sorted into first-order and higher-order theorists. Roughly, first-order representationalists hold that a ground-level representation of a certain kind suffices for phenomenal experience, while higher-order representationalists insist that phenomenal experiences also require a higher-order representation of the ground-level representations. I am tempted by the first-order view on grounds of parsimony. In this chapter, I rebut just one recent, introspectively-based argument for higher-order representationalism. (shrink)